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Abstract
Standard adversarial attacks change the predicted class
label of an image by adding specially tailored small per-
turbations to its pixels. In contrast, a universal pertur-
bation is an update that can be added to any image in a
broad class of images, while still changing the predicted
class label. We study the efficient generation of univer-
sal adversarial perturbations, and also efficient methods
for hardening networks to these attacks. We propose a
simple optimization-based universal attack that reduces the
top-1 accuracy of various network architectures on Ima-
geNet to less than 20%, while learning the universal per-
turbation 13× faster than the standard method. To defend
against these perturbations, we propose universal adversar-
ial training, which models the problem of robust classifier
generation as a two-player min-max game. This method is
much faster and more scalable than conventional adversar-
ial training with a strong adversary (PGD), and yet yields
models that are extremely resistant to universal attacks, and
comparably resistant to standard (per-instance) black box
attacks. We also discover a rather fascinating side-effect of
universal adversarial training: attacks built for universally
robust models transfer better to other (black box) models
than those built with conventional adversarial training.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adver-
sarial examples, in which small and often imperceptible per-
turbations change the class label of an image [33, 9, 23, 24].
Because of the security concerns this raises, there is increas-
ing interest in studying these attacks themselves, and also
designing mechanisms to defend against them.
Adversarial examples were originally formed by select-
ing a single base image, and then sneaking that base image
into a different class using a small perturbation [9, 7, 16].
This is done most effectively using (potentially expensive)
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Figure 1: A universal perturbation made using a subset of
ImageNet and the VGG-16 architecture. When added to the
validation images, their labels usually change. The pertur-
bation was generated using the proposed algorithm 2. Per-
turbations pixel values lie in [−10, 10] (i.e.  = 10).
iterative optimization procedures [8, 16, 2].
Different from per-instance perturbation attacks,
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [19, 20] show there exists “univer-
sal” perturbations that can be added to any image to change
its class label (fig. 1). Universal perturbations empower
attackers who cannot generate per-instance adversarial
examples on the go, or who want to change the identity
of an object to be selected later in the field. What’s
worse, universal perturbations have good cross-model
transferability, which facilitates black-box attacks.
Among various methods for hardening networks to per-
instance attacks, adversarial training [16] is known to dra-
matically increase robustness [2]. In this process, adver-
sarial examples are produced for each mini-batch during
training, and injected into the training data. While effec-
tive at increasing robustness, the high cost of this process
precludes its use on large and complex datasets. This cost
comes from the adversarial example generation process,
which frequently requires 5-30 iterations to produce an ex-
ample. Unfortunately, adversarial training using cheap,
non-iterative methods generally does not result in robust-
ness against stronger iterative adversaries [16].
Contributions This paper studies effective methods for
producing and deflecting universal adversarial attacks.
First, we pose the creation of universal perturbations as
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an optimization problem that can be effectively solved by
stochastic gradient methods. This method dramatically re-
duces the time needed to produce attacks as compared to
[19]. The efficiency of this formulation empowers us to con-
sider universal adversarial training. We formulate the adver-
sarial training problem as a min-max optimization where
the minimization is over the network parameters and the
maximization is over the universal perturbation. This prob-
lem can be solved quickly using alternating stochastic gra-
dient methods with no inner loops, making it far more ef-
ficient than per-instance adversarial training with a strong
adversary.
Interestingly, universal adversarial training has a number
of unexpected and useful side effects. While our models
are trained to resist universal perturbations, they are also
quite resistant to black-box per-instance attacks – achieving
resistance comparable to 7-step PGD adversarial training at
a fraction of the cost. Furthermore, per-instance adversarial
examples built for attacking our universally hardened model
transfer to other (black-box) natural and robust models very
well.
2. Related work
We briefly review per-instance perturbation attack tech-
niques that are closely related to our paper and will be
used in our experiments. The Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [9] is one of the most popular one-step gradient-
based approaches for `∞-bounded attacks. FGSM applies
one step of gradient ascent in the direction of the sign of
the gradient of the loss function with respect to the input
image. When a model is adversarially trained, the gradient
of the loss function may be very small near unmodified im-
ages. In this case, the R-FGSM method remains effective
by first using a random perturbation to step off the image
manifold, and then applying FGSM [34]. Projected Gradi-
ent Descent (PGD) [15, 16] iteratively applies FGSM mul-
tiple times, and is one of the strongest per-instance attacks
[16, 2]. The PGD version we use in this paper is adopted
from [16] and applies an initial random perturbation before
multiple steps of gradient ascent. Finally, DeepFool [21] is
an iterative method based on a linear approximation of the
training loss objective. This method formed the backbone
of the original method for producing universal adversarial
examples.
Adversarial training, in which adversarial attacks are in-
jected into the dataset during training, is an effective method
to learn a robust model resistant to attacks [16, 2, 11, 29,
31]. Robust models adversarially trained with FGSM can
resist FGSM attacks [15], but can be vulnerable to PGD at-
tacks [16]. Madry et al. [16] suggest strong attacks are im-
portant, and they use the iterative PGD method in the inner
loop for generating adversarial examples when optimizing
the min-max problem. PGD adversarial training is effec-
tive but time-consuming. The cost of the inner PGD loop is
high, although this can sometimes be replaced with neural
models for attack generation [3, 26, 36]. These robust mod-
els are adversarially trained to fend off per-instance pertur-
bations and have not been designed for, or tested against,
universal perturbations.
Unlike per-instance perturbations, universal perturba-
tions can be directly added to any test image to fool the
classifier. In [19], universal perturbations for image clas-
sification are generated by iteratively optimizing the per-
instance adversarial loss for training samples using Deep-
Fool [21]. In addition to classification tasks, universal per-
turbations are also shown to exist for semantic segmentation
[18]. Robust universal adversarial examples are generated
as a universal targeted adversarial patch in [5]. They are
targeted since they cause misclassification of the images to
a given target class. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [20] prove the
existence of small universal perturbations under certain cur-
vature conditions of decision boundaries. Data-independent
universal perturbations are also shown to exist and can be
generated by maximizing spurious activations at each layer.
These universal perturbations are slightly weaker than the
data dependent approaches [22].
There has been very little work on defending against uni-
versal attacks. To the best of our knowledge, the only ded-
icated study is by Akhtar et al., who propose a perturba-
tion rectifying network that pre-processes input images to
remove the universal perturbation [1]. The rectifying net-
work is trained on universal perturbations that are built for
the downstream classifier. While other methods of data san-
itization exist [28, 17] , it has been shown (at least for per-
instance adversarial examples) that this type of defense is
easily subverted by an attacker who is aware that a defense
network is being used [6].
A recent preprint [25] models the problem of defend-
ing against universal perturbations as a two-player min-max
game. However, unlike us, and similar to per-instance ad-
versarial training, after each gradient descent iteration for
updating the DNN parameters, they generate a universal
adversarial example in an iterative fashion. Since the gen-
eration of universal adversarial perturbations is very time-
consuming [1], this makes their approach very slow in prac-
tice and prevents them from training the neural network pa-
rameters for many iterations.
3. Optimization for universal perturbation
Given a set of training samples X = {xi, i = 1, . . . , N}
and a network f(w, ·) with frozen parameter w that maps
images onto labels, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [19] propose to
find universal perturbations δ that satisfy,
‖δ‖p ≤  and Prob(X, δ) ≥ 1− ξ, (1)
Algorithm 1 Iterative solver for universal perturbations [19]
Initialize δ ← 0
while Prob(X, δ) < 1− ξ do
for xi in X do
if f(w, xi + δ) 6= f(w, xi) then
Solve minr ‖r‖2 s.t. f(w, xi + δ + r) 6= f(w, xi)
by DeepFool [21]
Update δ ← δ + r, then project δ to `p ball
end if
end for
end while
Prob(X, δ) represents the “fooling ratio,” which is the frac-
tion of images x whose perturbed class label f(w, x + δ)
differs from the original label f(w, x). The parameter  con-
trols the `p diameter of the bounded perturbation, and ξ is
a small tolerance hyperparameter. Problem (1) is solved
by the iterative method in algorithm 1 [19]. This iterative
solver relies on an inner loop to apply DeepFool [21] to each
training instance, which makes the solver slow. Moreover,
the outer loop of algorithm 1 is not guaranteed to converge.
Different from [19], we consider the following optimiza-
tion problem for building universal perturbations,
max
δ
L(w, δ) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
l(w, xi + δ) s.t. ‖δ‖p ≤ , (2)
where l(w, ·) represents the loss used for training DNNs.
This simple formulation (2) searches for a universal per-
turbation that maximizes the training loss, and thus forces
images into the wrong class.
The naive formulation (2) suffers from a potentially
significant drawback; the cross-entropy loss is unbounded
from above, and can be arbitrarily large when evaluated on
a single image. In the worst-case, a perturbation that causes
misclassification of just a single image can maximize (2) by
forcing the average loss to infinity. To force the optimizer
to find a perturbation that fools many instances, we propose
a “clipped” version of the cross entropy loss,
lˆ(w, xi + δ) = min{l(w, xi + δ), β}. (3)
We cap the loss function at β to prevent any single image
from dominating the objective in (2), and giving us a better
surrogate of misclassification accuracy. In section 5.2, we
investigate the effect of clipping with different β.
We directly solve eq. (2) by a stochastic gradient method
described in algorithm 2. Each iteration begins by us-
ing gradient ascent to update the universal perturbation δ
to maximize the loss. Then, δ is projected onto the `p-
norm ball to prevent it from growing too large. We ex-
periment with various optimizers for this ascent step, in-
cluding Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD), Momentum
Algorithm 2 Stochastic gradient for universal perturbation
for epoch = 1 . . . Nep do
for minibatch B ⊂ X do
Update δ with gradient variant δ ← δ + g
Project δ to `p ball
end for
end for
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Figure 2: Classification accuracy on adversarial examples
of universal perturbations generated by increasing the cross-
entropy loss. PGD and ADAM converge faster. We use
5000 training samples from CIFAR-10 for constructing the
universal adversarial perturbation for naturally trained Wide
ResNet model from [16]. The batch-size is 128, =8, and
the learning-rate/step-size is 1.
SGD (MSGD), Projected Gradient Descent (PGD), and
ADAM [12].
We test this method by attacking a naturally trained
WideResnet CIFAR-10 model from [16]. Stochastic gra-
dient methods that use “normalized” gradients (ADAM and
PGD) are less sensitive to learning rate and converge faster,
as shown in fig. 2. We visualize the generated univer-
sal perturbation from different optimizers in fig. 3. Com-
pared to the noisy perturbation generated by SGD, normal-
ized gradient methods produced stronger attacks with more
well-defined geometric structures and checkerboard pat-
terns. The final evaluation accuracies (on test-examples) af-
ter adding universal perturbations with  = 8 were 42.56%
for the SGD perturbation, 13.08% for MSGD, 13.30% for
ADAM, and 13.79% for PGD. The clean test accuracy of
WideResnet is 95.2%.
The proposed method of universal attack using a clipped
loss function has several advantages. It is based on a stan-
dard stochastic gradient method that comes with conver-
gence guarantees when a decreasing learning rate is used
[4]. Also, each iteration is based on a minibatch of sam-
ples instead of one instance, which accelerates computation
on a GPU. Finally, each iteration requires a simple gradient
(a) SGD (b) MSGD (c) ADAM (d) PGD
Figure 3: Visualizations of universal perturbations after 160
iterations of the optimizers depicted in fig. 2.
Algorithm 3 Adversarial training for universal perturbation
Input: Training samples X , perturbation bound , learning
rate τ , momentum µ
for epoch = 1 . . . Nep do
for minibatch B ⊂ X do
Update w with momentum stochastic gradient
gw ← µgw − Ex∈B [∇w l(w, x+ δ)]
w ← w + τgw
Update δ with stochastic gradient ascent
δ ← δ + sign(Ex∈B [∇δ l(w, x+ δ)])
Project δ to `p ball
end for
end for
update instead of the complex DeepFool inner loop; we em-
pirically verify fast convergence and good performance of
the proposed method (see section 5).
4. Universal adversarial training
We now consider training robust classifiers that are re-
sistant to universal perturbations. In particular, we consider
universal adversarial training, and formulate this problem
as a min-max optimization problem,
min
w
max
δ
L(w, δ) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
l(w, xi + δ)
s.t. ‖δ‖p ≤ ,
(4)
where w represents the neural network weights, X =
{xi, i = 1, . . . , N} represents training samples, δ repre-
sents universal perturbation noise, and l(·) is the loss func-
tion. We solve eq. (4) by alternating stochastic gradient
methods in algorithm 3. Each iteration alternatively updates
the neural network weights w using gradient descent, and
then updates the universal perturbation δ using ascent.
We compare our formulation (4) and algorithm 3 with
PGD-based adversarial training in [16], which trains a ro-
bust model by optimizing the following min-max problem,
min
w
max
Z
1
N
N∑
i=1
l(w, zi) s.t. ‖Z −X‖p ≤ . (5)
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Figure 4: Classification accuracy for (adversarial) training
of (robust) models with (top) FGSM update and (bottom)
ADAM update. We show the accuracy before and after the
gradient ascent for δ in algorithm 3. We omitted the figure
for SGD update because the gap between the two curves for
SGD is invisible.
The standard formulation (5) searches for per-instance per-
turbed images Z, while our formulation in (4) maximizes
using a universal perturbation δ. Madry et al. [16] solve (5)
by a stochastic method. In each iteration, an adversarial ex-
ample zi is generated for an input instance by the PGD itera-
tive method, and the neural network parameter w is updated
once [16]. Our formulation (algorithm 3) only maintains
one single perturbation that is used and refined in all itera-
tions. For this reason, we need only update w and δ once
per step (i.e., there is no expensive inner loop), and these
updates accumulate for both w and δ through training.
In fig. 4, we present training curves for the universal ad-
versarial training process on the WideResnet model from
[16] using the CIFAR-10 dataset. We consider different
rules for updating δ during universal adversarial training,
FGSM δ ← δ +  · sign(Ex∈B [∇δl(w, x+ δ)]), (6)
SGD δ ← δ + τδ · Ex∈B [∇δl(w, x+ δ)], (7)
and ADAM [12]. We found that the FGSM update rule was
most effective when combined with the SGD optimizer for
updating neural network weights w.
One way to assess the update rule is to plot the model
accuracy before and after the ascent step (i.e., the pertur-
bation update). It is well-known that adversarial training is
more effective when stronger attacks are used. In the ex-
treme case of a do-nothing adversary, the adversarial train-
ing method degenerates to natural training. In fig. 5, we
see a gap between the accuracy curves plotted before and
after gradient ascent. We find that the FGSM update rule
leads to a larger gap, indicating a stronger adversary. Cor-
respondingly, we find that the FGSM update rule yields net-
works that are more robust to attacks as compared to SGD
update (see fig. 5). Interestingly, although universal train-
ing using an FGSM update and ADAM update are both ro-
bust to universal perturbation attacks, a robust model with
FGSM update is more robust to per-instance attacks than
that which uses the ADAM update rule. The accuracy of
a universally hardened network against a white-box per-
instance PGD attack is 17.21% for FGSM universal train-
ing, and only 2.57% for ADAM universal training.
4.1. Attacking hardened models
We evaluate the robustness of different models by apply-
ing algorithm 2 to try to find universal perturbations. We
attack universally adversarial trained models (produced by
eq. (4)) using the FGSM universal update rule (uFGSM), or
the SGD universal update rule (uSGD). We also consider a
robust model from per-instance adversarial training (eq. (5))
with adversarial steps of the FGSM and PGD type [16].
The training curves for the robust WideResnet models
on CIFAR-10 are plotted in fig. 5. Robust models adver-
sarially trained with weaker attackers such as uSGD and
FGSM are relatively vulnerable to universal perturbations,
while robust models from PGD [16] and uFGSM can re-
sist universal perturbations. We apply PGD (using the sign
of the gradient) and ADAM in algorithm 3 to generate uni-
versal perturbations for these robust models, and show such
perturbations in fig. 6. Comparing fig. 6 (a,b,c,d) with fig. 6
(e,f,g,h), we see that universal perturbations generated by
PGD and ADAM are different but have similar patterns.
Universal perturbations generated for weaker robust mod-
els have more textures, as shown in fig. 6 (a,d,e,h) .
5. Universal perturbations for ImageNet
To validate the performance of our proposed optimiza-
tion on different architectures and more complex datasets,
we apply algorithm 2 to various popular architectures de-
signed for classification on the ImageNet dataset [27]. We
compare our method of universal perturbation generation
with the current state-of-the-art method, Iterative DeepFool
(iDeepFool for short) [19]. We use the authors’ code to run
the iDeepFool attack on these classification networks. For
fair comparison, we execute both our method and iDeep-
Fool on the exact same 5000 training data points and ter-
minate both methods after 10 epochs. We use  = 10 for
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Figure 5: Classification accuracy on training data when the
universal perturbations are updated with the ADAM opti-
mizer. We use 5000 training samples from CIFAR-10 for
constructing the universal adversarial perturbation for an
adversarially trained WideResnet model from [16]. The
batch-size is 128, =8, and the learning-rate/step-size is 1.
(a) FGSM (b) PGD (c) uFGSM (d) uSGD
(e) FGSM (f) PGD (g) uFGSM (h) uSGD
Figure 6: The universal perturbations made using PGD and
ADAM for 4 different robust models trained on CIFAR-
10: adversarially trained with FGSM or PGD, and univer-
sally adversarially trained with FGSM (uFGSM) or SGD
(uSGD). Perturbations were made using 400 iterations. The
top row perturbations are made using PGD and the bottom
row perturbations are made using ADAM.
`∞ constraint following [19], use a step-size of 1.0 for our
method, and use suggested parameters for iDeepFool. We
independently execute iDeepFool since we are interested in
the accuracy of the classifier on attacked images – a metric
not reported in their paper 1.
1They report “fooling ratio” which is the ratio of examples who’s la-
bel prediction changes after applying the universal perturbation. This has
become an uncommon metric since the fooling ratio can increase if the uni-
versal perturbation causes an example that was originally miss-classified to
become correctly classified.
(a) InceptionV1 (b) VGG16 (c) InceptionV3 (d) ResNet-V1 152
Figure 7: Universal perturbations generated using our algorithm 2 for different network architectures on ImageNet. Visually,
these perturbations which are for naturally trained models are structured.
5.1. Benefits of the proposed method
We compare the performance of our stochastic gradient
method for eq. (2) and the iDeepFool method for eq. (1)
in [19]. We generate universal perturbation for Inception
[32] and VGG [30] networks trained on ImageNet [27], and
report the top-1 accuracy in table 1. Universal perturba-
tion generated by both iDeepFool and our method can fool
networks and degrade the classification accuracy. Univer-
sal perturbations generated for the training samples gener-
alize well and cause the accuracy of the validation samples
to drop. However, when given a fixed computation budget
such as number of passes on the training data (i.e., epochs),
our method outperforms iDeepFool by a large margin. Our
stochastic gradient method generates the universal pertur-
bations at a much faster pace than iDeepFool. About 20×
faster on InceptionV1 and 6× on VGG16 (13× on average).
After verifying the effectiveness and efficiency of our
proposed stochastic gradient method2, we use our algo-
rithm 2 to generate universal perturbations for more ad-
vanced architectures such as ResNet-V1 152 [10] and
Inception-V3 [32] (and for other experiments in the remain-
ing sections). Our attacks degrade the validation accuracy
of ResNet-V1 152 and Inception-V3 from 76.8% and 78%
to 16.4% and 20.1%, respectively. The final universal per-
turbations used for the results presented in this section are
illustrated in fig. 7.
5.2. The effect of clipping
In this section we analyze the effect of the “clipping” loss
parameter β in eq. (2). For this purpose, similar to our other
ablation experiments, we generate universal perturbation by
solving eq. (2) using PGD for Inception-V3 on ImageNet.
Since the results and performance could slightly vary
with different random initializations, we run each experi-
ment with 5 random subsets of training data. The accuracy
2Unless otherwise specified, we use the sign-of-gradient PGD for our
stochastic gradient optimizer in algorithm 2.
Table 1: Top-1 accuracy on ImageNet for natural images,
and adversarial images with universal perturbation.
InceptionV1 VGG16
Natural Train 76.9% 81.4 %Val 69.7% 70.9%
iDeepFool Train 43.5% 39.5%Val 40.7% 36.0%
Ours Train 17.2% 23.1%Val 19.8% 22.5%
iDeepFool time (s) 9856 6076
our time (s) 482 953
reported is the classification accuracy on the entire valida-
tion set of ImageNet after adding the universal perturbation.
The results are summarized in fig. 8. The results showcase
the value of our proposed loss function for finding universal
adversarial perturbations.
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Figure 8: Attack performance varies with clipping param-
eter β in eq. (2). Attacking Inception-V3 (with natural
validation accuracy 78%) is more successful with clipping
(β = 9) than without clipping (β =∞).
5.3. How much training data does the attack need?
As in [19], we analyze how the number of training points
(|X|) affects the strength of universal perturbations in fig. 9.
In particular, we build δ using varying amounts of training
data. For each experiment, we report the accuracy on the
entire validation set after we add the perturbation δ. We
consider four cases for |X|: 500, 1000, 2000, and 4000 3.
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Figure 9: The attack performance significantly improves
when the number of training points is larger than the num-
ber of classes. For reference, Inception-V3’s top-1 accuracy
is 78%. Using only a small fraction of the training-data
(4,000 / 1,281,167) is enough to degrade the validation and
train accuracy to around 20%.
6. Experiment: universal adversarial training
In this section, we analyze our robust models that are
universal adversarially trained by solving the min-max
problem (section 4) using algorithm 3. We use  = 8 for
the `∞ constraint for CIFAR-10 following [16], and  = 10
for ImageNet following [19].
6.1. Defense against white-box attack
We compare our universal adversarilly trained model’s
robustness with other hardened models against white-box
attacks, where the (robust) models are fully revealed to the
attackers. We attack the hardened and natural models us-
ing universal perturbations (section 3) and per-instance per-
turbations (FGSM [9], R-FGSM [34], and a 20-step l∞-
bounded PGD attack with step-size 2 [16]). We also re-
port the performance of per-instance adversarially trained
models which are trained with per-instance attacks such as
FGSM, R-FGSM and PGD [16]. We use universal adversar-
ial training from algorithm 3 to build a robust WideResnet
[37] on CIFAR-10 [13], and a robust AlexNet [14] using
3The number of epochs (Nep in algorithm 2) was 100 epochs for 500
data samples, 40 for 1000 and 2000 samples, and 10 for 4000 samples.
Table 2: White-box performance of hardened WideResnet
models trained on CIFAR-10. We use different attacks to
evaluate their robustness. Note that Madry’s PGD training
is significantly slower than the other training methods.
Attack method
UnivPert FGSM R-FGSM PGD
(Robust)
models
trained
with
Natural 9.2% 13.3% 7.3% 0.0%
FGSM 51.0% 95.2% 90.2% 0.0%
R-FGSM 57.0% 97.5% 96.1% 0.0%
PGD 86.1% 56.2% 67.2% 45.8%
Ours 91.8% 37.3% 48.6% 17.2%
5000 training samples of ImageNet [27]. The PGD per-
instance adversarial training is done by training on adversar-
ial examples that are built using 7 steps of PGD following
[16], which makes it 4× slower than the non-iterative ad-
versarial training methods such as our universal adversarial
training, FGSM, and R-FGSM adversarial training.
We summarize the CIFAR-10 results in table 2. The
natural model, as also seen in section 3, is vulnerable to
universal and per-instance perturbations. Our robust model
achieves best classification (i.e. highest robustness) accu-
racy against universal perturbation attacks. The 20-step
PGD attack fools the natural, FGSM robust, and R-FGSM
robust models almost every time. Interestingly, our model is
relatively resistant to the PGD attack, though not as robust
as the PGD-based robust model. This result is particularly
interesting when we consider that our method is hardened
using universal perturbations. While the computational cost
of our method is similar to that of non-iterative per-instance
adversarial training methods (FGSM, and RFGSM), our
model is considerably more robust against the PGD attack
that is known to be the strongest per-instance attack.
Since our universal adversarial training algorithm is
cheap, it scales to large datasets such as ImageNet. As seen
in fig. 10 (a), the AlexNet trained using our universal ad-
versarial training algorithm (algorithm 3) is robust against
universal attacks generated using both algorithm 1 and al-
gorithm 2. The naturally trained AlexNet is susceptible to
universal attacks. The final attacks generated for the robust
and natural models are presented in fig. 10 (b,c). The uni-
versal perturbation generated for the robust AlexNet model
has little structure compared to the universal perturbation
built for the naturally trained AlexNet. This is similar to the
trend we observed in fig. 3 and fig. 6 for the WideResnet
models trained on CIFAR-10.
6.2. Transferability and black-box robustness
We study the transferability of our robust model in the
black-box threat setting, in which we generate adversarial
examples based on a source model and use them to attack
a target model. We study the transferability of the adver-
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Figure 10: Training universal perturbation can fool naturally trained AlexNet, but fails to fool our robust AlexNet. We
smoothed the curves in (a) for better visualization. The universal perturbation generated for the universal adversarial trained
AlexNet on ImageNet has little geometric structure compared to that of the naturally trained network.
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Figure 11: Visualization of the original/natural image and the per-instance adversarial examples generated for the naturally
trained and our universally robust model trained with algorithm 3. The examples are the last 10 images of the CIFAR-10
validation set. The adversarial examples have  = 30 and are generated using an l∞ 50-step PGD attack with step-size 2. The
classifiers’ predictions on the examples are printed underneath the images. The large- adversarial examples generated for
our universal robust model seem to often produce salient characteristics of the targeted class. The predictions of our robust
model on the adversarial examples align well with human perception.
sarial 20-step PGD per-instance examples between various
models with the WideResnet architecture that are trained
on CIFAR-10: natural trained model, FGSM trained robust
model, R-FGSM trained robust model, PGD trained robust
model [16], and our robust model.
The results are summarized in table 3. By examining
rows of table 3, both the PGD-based robust model and our
robust model are fairly hardened to black-box attacks made
for various source models. By examining columns of ta-
ble 3, we can compare the transferability of the attacks made
for various source models. In this metric, the attacks built
for our robust model are the strongest in terms of transfer-
ability and can deteriorate the performance of both natu-
ral and other robust models. An adversary can enhance her
Table 3: Black-box attack and defense on CIFAR-10. The
adversarial examples are generated by PGD.
Attack source
Natural FGSM RFGSM PGD Ours
Natural - 34.1% 64.9% 77.4% 22.0%
FGSM 53.9% - 14.1% 69.6% 22.7%
RFGSM 71.5% 16.0% - 71.7% 20.3%
PGD 84.1% 86.3% 86.3% - 76.3%
Ours 90.0% 90.8% 91.0% 70.4% -
Average 74.9% 56.8% 64.1% 72.3% 35.4%
black-box attack by first making her source model univer-
sally robust!
6.3. Visualizing attacks on robust models
Tsipras et al. [35] use several visualization techniques
to analyze PGD-based robust models and show some un-
expected benefits of adversarial robustness. Similarly, we
generate large  `∞ per-instance adversarial examples us-
ing a PGD attack without random initialization. Large 
perturbations make the perturbations visible. Adversarial
examples built in this way for both a natural model and our
robust model are illustrated in fig. 11. Many of the adversar-
ial examples of the natural model look similar to the original
image and have a lot of “random” noise on the background,
while adversarial examples for our robust model produce
salient characteristics of another class and align well with
human perception. The elimination of structured univer-
sal perturbations during universal adversarial training seems
to have this interesting side-effect that was only recently
shown for PGD adversarial training.
7. Conclusion
We proposed using stochastic gradient methods and a
“clipped” loss function as an effective universal attack that
generates universal perturbations much faster than previous
methods. To defend against these universal adversaries, we
proposed to train robust models by optimizing a min-max
problem using alternating stochastic gradient methods. We
systematically study the robustness of our robust model un-
der the white-box and black-box threat models. Our ex-
periments suggest that our robust model can resist white-
box universal perturbations, and to some extent per-instance
perturbations. In the black-box threat model, our robust
model is as robust as the much more expensive PGD ad-
versarial training. Moreover, the per-instance adversarial
examples generated for our robust model transfer better to
attack other models. Due to the relatively cheap computa-
tional overhead of our proposed universal adversarial train-
ing algorithm, we can easily train robust models for large-
scale datasets such as ImageNet.
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